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VITALISM AND SYSTEM:
JACOBI AND FICHTE ON PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
Rolf Ahlers
Abstract: This paper thematizes the crucial agreement and point of depar-
ture between Jacobi and Fichte at the height of the “atheism controversy.”
The argument on the proper relationship between philosophy and existence
or speculation and life had far-reaching consequences in the history of thought
after Jacobi and Fichte in German Idealism on the one hand, primarly advo-
cated by Schelling and Hegel, and on the other hand by existentialism and
vitalism. The essay focuses first on Jacobi’s philosophy of life, which cen-
trally influenced and attracted Fichte to Jacobi. Jacobi’s dualism between
speculation, of which he was skeptical, and life, became Fichte’s dualism.
Fichte’s transcendentalism, however, prioritized, contrary to Jacobi, both
speculation and systematicity. Both of these elements became central for
later forms of German Idealism. In the last part of the essay Hegel’s absolute
idealism becomes the platform affording a critical perspective on Fichte’s
transcendental philosophy.
The immediacy of life could for Fichte in 1799 not have any reality without the
abstraction from life accomplished by speculative philosophy. Both “speculation”
and “life” do not really have any common ground between them—a position which
Reinhold attempted to find—because both oppose each other but are also dependent
upon another. As “life” could not be had without speculation, so “speculation” is
impossible without life, for it needs life to be able to abstract from it. Fichte made
this very clear at the height of the “atheism-controversy,” in a letter to Jacobi of
April 22, 1799,1 in which he says this (1799:61):2
The original duality, which traverses through the whole system of reason, and
which is grounded in the duality of the subject-object is here on its highest
plateau. LIFE is the TOTALITY of the OBJECTIVE ESSENCE OF REASON;
SPECULATION is the TOTALITY of SUBJECTIVITY. One is not possible
without the other: LIFE, understood as active surrender into the mechanism is
not possible WITHOUT ACTIVITY AND FREEDOM (otherwise called specu-
lation), WHICH SURRENDERS. This is so even if it does not right away
achieve clear consciousness in each individual. And SPECULATION is not
possible without LIFE, FROM WHICH IT ABSTRACTS. Both, life and specu-
lation are determinable only through each other. LIFE is actually
NON-PHILOSOPHIZING; PHILOSOPHIZING is actually NON-LIFE, and I
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know no better determinations of both concepts than these developed here.
Here we have a complete antithesis and a point of unification3 is just as im-
possible as the understanding of the X, which underlies the subject-object, the
I, as its ground. Such a point of unification is impossible except in the con-
sciousness of the philosopher that for him both points of view are present.
(Fichte, 1799:61)
If we read such words, we can understand why both Fichte and Jacobi thought in
1799 that their systems are very close. For Jacobi had for all of his life stressed a clear
separation of thought and life. Nonetheless, Fichte’s position clearly differs from
Jacobi’s in significant points. Also Reinhold,4 who had earlier influenced Fichte’s
attempt to solve a basic aporia of Kant’s thought in his move toward a coherent sys-
tem (Bondeli, 1995:124), and who in turn was during the second phase of his thought
(Bondeli, 1995:155ff) influenced by Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, should have recog-
nized in the quoted words by Fichte that their thought was at this time really no longer
in agreement. I will explain how these points of coherence and disagreement came
about in the evolvement of transcendental philosophy after Kant. We can now trace in
minute detail key elements in the development of transcendental idealism. Addressing
the particular discussion between Fichte, Jacobi and Reinhold,5 Klaus Hammacher
speaks of “one of the most profound conflicts . . . in which transcendental philosophy
got involved around 1800, the conflict about critique and life” (1993:72).6 It led to the
important separation of two strands of thought that have become influential down to
our time. The first we can call the tradition of “realism” (or “life”). From Jacobi7 and
Fichte8 (also Herder, Goethe, Novalis, and Hölderlin) this tradition of thought led
over the early Schelling, Fr. Schlegel, the early Hegel, and Schleiermacher to Feuerbach,
Marx, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche to Dilthey and later phenomenological and herme-
neutic thought (Dierse, 1980). The second strand of thought, cultivating “speculation”
and philosophy led to “idealism”—Fichte, Fr. Schlegel, the early and later Schelling
and Hegel. First, (a) I will thematize those elements of Jacobi’s thought on philosophy
and life, expressed in his novels, which (b) aroused Fichte’s early interest and which
he appropriated. After (c) having described Fichte’s Jacobian realism I will (d), lean-
ing on Hegel’s early Jena interpretation of Fichte, show how the infinite regress is
rooted in Fichte’s idealistic realism.
A. Jacobi’s Philosophy of the Novel
First some comments on the enormous influence of Jacobi’s philosophy of the novel.
Central to Jacobi’s novels Allwill (1792) and Woldemar is the dichotomy between
philosophy and life. Life has priority for Jacobi. The nature and purpose of his novel
Allwill, Jacobi says in his letter to Hamann of June 16, 1783, is “to disclose being,”
that is, the being of humanity.9 It is the “highest merit” and obligation of the scholar
to reveal the “natural history” of humanity. Just this formulation appears also in the
Letters on Spinoza of 1785. He says here: “According to my judgment it is the high-
est merit of the scholar to reveal being. . . . Explanation is his means to find a path to
the goal. It is his most proximate, never the ultimate goal. The ultimate purpose is
what cannot be explained: That which cannot be solved, the immediate the simple.”
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(1785:29:20–24) So his purpose is to lay bare the modern human soul. What is the
central disposition of modern humanity? By means of philosophy and science mod-
ern humanity alienates itself from the foundations of life. But why? Modern humanity
has a drive, indeed, a compulsion to justify itself by means of philosophy and sci-
ence.10 In his philosophical novels Jacobi explains why and how this is so. Reinhard
Lauth (1971) and Klaus Hammacher (1969, 1990) have provided excellent studies
on this subject: The modern intellectual is characterized by the anthropological prin-
ciple of the necessity of modern humanity to justify itself. And that places the I in
the center of this anthropology. During their evolving dialogue, Jacobi learns to
understand Fichte’s principle I=I as the best example of this modern disposition of
humanity—but this is only one dominant theme Jacobi learns to see in Fichte. For
there is, as we shall see, much common ground between them. Pointing to this an-
thropological propensity of self-justification in modern humanity Jacobi says in his
conversations with Lessing, “Whenever someone has fallen in love with his (philo-
sophical) explanations he blindly accepts any conclusion drawn from it, a conclusion
which he cannot reject.11 This is so even if he would walk on his head.” (1785:29)12
Such an ego, I-centered fixation, Jacobi insists, is as unnatural and blind to reality
as walking on your head. And doing this turns everything upside down.13 The ques-
tion is, however, whether the conceptual inversion, which Kant already accomplished
with his Copernican revolution of thought (1781:BXIf, 1790, §28) is not deeply
humanizing. The question is whether it is indeed not necessary for the determina-
tion of life and whether opting for the unreflected, immediate reality, does not gain
but rather lose it, contrary to its intentions. Jacobi’s anthropological methodology
must and will inevitably clash with Fichte’s transcendental philosophy in “the high-
est degree of antipathy” (Jacobi, 1799a:9). However, it took some time from the
beginning of Jacobi’s and Fichte’s interest in one another to the high point of their
struggle during the Atheism Controversy in 1799 until they would see clearly their
points of convergence and disagreements. Fichte would ultimately recognize the
“harmful error” (1800d:65) of Jacobi’s anthropologizing philosophy. It caused him
ultimately to misunderstand Fichte, however keen his insights into Fichte’s thought
were. But first to Jacobi’s impact on Fichte.
B. Fichte’s and Jacobi’s Common Interests
Jacobi’s and Fichte’s common interests become clear in the discussions carried out
in their correspondence on the correct relationship of philosophy and life at the height
of the Atheism Controversy. But it developed much earlier. In his letter to Jacobi of
August 30, 1795, Fichte mentions to Jacobi the “striking similarity of our convic-
tions.” (1930:I, 251, 501) And in the Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre
(1797:508) he points to an absolute immediacy which underlies all mediating dem-
onstration, an immediacy which itself cannot be demonstrated. And he stresses that
he and Jacobi share this common assumption.14
In the late spring of 1794 Goethe had sent to Jacobi Fichte’s Begriffsschrift right
after it appeared in print. On June 7 Jacobi replies, thanking him, and stating: “Right
away I turned to Fichte’s book and read it . . . attentively. I was pleased by the book”
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(Jacobi-Goethe 1846:138). The Atheism Controversy developed four years later,
during 1798 and 1799. Jacobi intervened into this development with his
Sendschreiben (1799a). Here Jacobi expresses to Fichte their points of agreement in
theological terminology. But he expresses to the nineteen year younger Fichte not
only their points of agreement. The Sendschreiben makes clear that Jacobi thinks he
has influenced Fichte in key areas. “You have recognized me as the one who stood
waiting and prophesying at the door of your lecture-hall, long before it opened”
(1799a:9; 1994:505).15 Jacobi thematizes the prophecies in the Beylage on Tran-
scendental Philosophy to his David Hume (1787b). He is right that he has anticipated
transcendental idealism. The correspondence between Fichte and Jacobi from 1794
to the Sendschreiben confirm that Fichte had great interest in Jacobi’s thought: He,
Jacobi, stood waiting and prophesying at the door of Fichte’s lecture hall long be-
fore it opened. That means at the latest since 1787 (1787b). For this reason he, the
“privileged heretic,” occupies an “exceptional seat” in Fichte’s lectures since he
knows that his thinking occupies a central place in Fichte’s thought. He is a “privi-
leged heretic” because of his own thoughts expressed already in 1785 (1785) and
1787 (1787b). Those thoughts on philosophy of “identity” identified “the Kantian
moral law” as the “necessary drive of the correspondence with ourselves, the law of
identity”16 (1799a:18). He complained about the incongruence of Kant’s Categori-
cal Imperative. These incomprehensible incongruencies, these “stop-gaps of
theoretical reason” are then made “the conditions of the reality of the laws of prac-
tical reason. . . . Imagine my jubilation, therefore, at the publication of your writing
on the Vocation of the Scholar, where in the very first pages I found the most com-
plete agreement with my judgments on this subject” (1799a:18). For that reason he
is also “exempt in advance from any anathema” (1799a:8). Nonetheless he is—al-
though “privileged”—a “heretic.” This is so because he now, during the Atheism
Controversy, he is not really any more capable of identifying with Fichte’s thought,
the thought of the “messiah of speculative reason.” For he does not at all, as does
Fichte, belong to the “Jews of speculative reason.” He is rather only a “Nathanael
among the gentiles,” the uncircumcised Israelite. He is uncircumcised, because for
him, the Christian, in contrast to the Jews, the issue of circumcision is moot. He is
“Nathanael,”17 who was recognized by the Messiah from afar as an “Israelite in
whom is no guile” (John 1:43–51). This Nathanael proclaimed Jesus as the “King of
the Jews,” but it was also he who asked: “What good can come from Nazareth?”
Well, what about the privileged heretic’s prophecies?
Jacobi’s relationship to Fichte was from beginning to end rather differentiated.
At the very beginning of the Preface and Introduction of his David Hume he refers
to what he had already said in the Briefe: “All human cognition derives from revela-
tion and faith” (1787a:3f; 1994:538). Two years earlier, in the Briefe, Jacobi stressed:
“We know through faith that we have a body and that there are outside of us other
bodies and other thinking beings. It is truly a wonderful revelation!” (1785:116:5–
7). Günter Zöller identifies this view of faith as “irreligious,” indeed, as “emphatically
secular” (1998a:31, 28). This view of faith, which, in the eyes of Hegel, “denies
the objectivity of Reason in knowledge” (1802b:347:8f; 1802c:97), relies on the
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skeptical-realistic thought of David Hume, expressed well in Jacobi’s book David Hume
(1787a). The natural, not religious understanding of faith, derived from David Hume,
relies on a “revelation of nature which does not only command but coerces each and
every human being to believe and to accept truths through faith” (1785:116:18–20).
“The Christian religion teaches a different view of faith. The Christian religion
does not command faith” (1785:116:21–22). “This faith does not objectify eternal
truths but rather the finite and fallible nature of humanity” (1785:116:22ff). This
specifically religious view of faith does not operate with coercion and with the law.18
It is based on freedom. So is Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. In §2 of the Begriffsschrift
of 1794 this “science” is characterized as being completely dependent on the freely
originating capacities of the scientific philosopher.19 Jacobi and Fichte share their
pathos for freedom, even if they disagree about speculation. For both the finite,
accidental nature of humanity gains focus in the free, i.e., not speculative accep-
tance of a trans-natural God. Speculation must in any case be blind over against
God. For both speculation as also any philosophy must remain blind over against
God. For it and every type of philosophy does no more than attempt to secure hu-
manity over against God.20 The coercion of thought promotes the establishment of
that security. For this reason God, the goal of true religion, must reside for Jacobi
beyond or outside of thought, for philosophy and speculation attempt only to fatal-
istically protect finite humanity from true life.21 For this reason Jacobi says22: “God
is, and is outside me, a living, self-subsisting being, or I am God. There is no third”
(1799a:22, 1994:524).23 And Jacobi characterizes this true, religious view of faith
as “my un-philosophy which has its essence in not-knowing.” Fichte’s thought, on
the other hand is subsumed “completely in knowledge” (1799a:6).
So Jacobi postulates a double principle of faith as the road to knowledge: The
secular faith and revelation which imparts knowledge, and the religious or Chris-
tian faith in a not-knowable God. Although Jacobi anticipates idealism24, this double
principle of faith is nonetheless “incompatible with idealism” (Zöller, 1998a:31) for
the very purpose of Jacobi’s idealism-critique is to put it into question. But pre-
cisely Jacobi’s intensive preoccupation with and promotion of proto-idealistic thought
influenced Fichte—among others. So his hunch is correct that Fichte learned from
him. For on the one hand he discovers his own realistic view of faith, particularly in
view of the Kantian thing in itself, in Fichte’s Begriffsschrift of 1794. And on the
other hand he recognizes the influence on Fichte of his doctrine of freedom and
origination. Right in the first paragraph of the Grundlage of 1794/95 it is expressed
with the concept Thathandlung: This concept “expresses that acting deed which
does not occur among the empirical conditions of our consciousness nor can it oc-
cur among those conditions, for it is the ground and source of all consciousness,
making it alone possible.” (1794/95:91) Jacobi recognizes here his own views on
revelation and faith. It speaks about the unconditioned foundation of all human knowl-
edge and action. Jacobi recognizes it in Fichte’s “first, altogether unconditioned
principle,” the Thathandlung of the Grundlage. It is a thought—I refer to Tom
Rockmore (Jacobi 1994:96)—which is influenced both by the foundational thought
of Reinhold as also by the antifoundational thought of Jacobi. See also Christian
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Iber. He writes (1999:27): “On the one hand [Fichte] ties [in §1 of the Grundlage]
into Reinhold’s thesis that only the establishment of a first principle makes philoso-
phy a rigorous science. On the other hand Fichte depends on Jacobi’s thesis that all
conditioned knowledge rests on the certainty of something unconditioned.” Jacobi
thematizes the rootedness of any foundational undertaking in an unconditioned. But
therein lies a circle. Fichte becomes conscious of the circular argument and pro-
nounces it: “The laws according to which human knowledge must think, or—which
is the same thing—the laws according to which reflection operates, still are in need
of being verified, but they are silently assumed to be known, and they are being
presupposed. . . . This is a circle. But it is an unavoidable circle” (1794/95:92).25
Fichte expresses often this circularity. Here he refers to §7 of the Begriffsschrift
(1794c), where he says essentially the same thing. The rules of logic must both be
deduced by the process of transcendental reflection as also presupposed by this
reflection. But also this circular argument is indebted to Jacobi, who had discovered
a basic aporia in Kant’s thought:
Depending on Hume, Jacobi changes realistically the aporia of Kant’s philoso-
phy. He modifies the aporia in such a way that it reappears as a doctrine of immediacy.
This is the doctrine which influenced Fichte. (Hammacher, 1993:74) The tongue on
the scale of this aporia is the doctrine of the thing in itself. It contains the incongru-
ity which Jacobi expresses in the Beylage on Transcendental Idealism (1787b) which
Jacobi appended to his David Hume. He says here, Kant operates on the one hand
with real-philosophical and on the other with idealistic or transcendental-philo-
sophical presuppositions. He observes that Kant presupposes on the one hand
realistically an objective world which is accessible to us through the senses—the
“thing.” But in Kant’s exploration of the way we know this world, this objective
thing changes into a mere transcendental noumenon. For without the explanation of
the transcendental grounds of knowledge, which changes things into appearances,
we cannot know anything. Kant’s relating aporetically a presupposed real world,
which, however, dissolves idealistically in a mere noumenon in the context of the
opposing transcendental presupposition (Arndt 1994:58) caused Jacobi to come to
the understanding “that I could not get into the (Kantian) system without that pre-
supposition (of the thing in itself) and that I could not remain within the system with
it.” (1787b:304) Underlying this presupposition of the thing in itself is the convic-
tion of the objective validity of our sensual experiences of objects outside us as
things in themselves and not only as merely subjective phenomenal appearances.
But also the opposing conviction of the objective validity of the transcendental
process of reflection is presupposed “as a realistically real determinant.” (1787b:305)
But these are “assertions which cannot at all be squared with the Kantian philoso-
phy” (1787b:305). For that reason it is necessary to remove both presuppositions
from the process of thought and to substitute them with an unreflected immediacy.
“The object contributes just as much toward the perception of consciousness as con-
sciousness does toward the perception of the object. I experience that I am and that
there is something outside of me in one and the same moment” (1787a:175).26 Klaus
Düsing formulates Jacobi’s basic insight in this way: “It is Jacobi’s philosophical
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deed to have submerged reason as a whole into the feeling of itself” (1993:7). With
this deed a new philosophical continent had been discovered. Fichte appropriated it.
For Jacobi’s experience of the self as immediately real and its “inseparable” experi-
ence with what lies “outside” of it leads to Fichte’s “I=I.” Simultaneously Jacobi
elevated with his proof of a basic aporia in the thought of Kant the philospophical
discussion onto a new plane. That discussion pointed to new avenues which lay
beyond Jacobi. For Jacobi proposed the Humeian sensuality and feeling as the real-
ity capable of mediating between self and thing in itself. This new “realism,” to
which he subscribes according to his own self-attestations, does resolve the Kantian
aporia, but it does so with Jacobi’s unique “idealistic” liability: That realism is itself
only produced or represented in thought. This presents new problems and possibili-
ties. Zöller formulates those avenues this way: “We conclude that one cannot get
into the Kantian system without Jacobi’s realism and that we cannot remain in it
with that realism” (1998a:31). This insight leads Fichte to modify the unspeculatively
conceived immediate certainty into its speculative form of the I=I. But a further step
plays a role here:
Fichte discovers in his Aenesidemus review, which Dan Breazeale called “a revo-
lution (not only) in his own philosophical development” but also “a genuine watershed
in the history of German Idealism” (1981:546),27 “the immediately most certain: I
am” (1794:20). It is the result of a process of reflection which followed the goal of
overcoming the mentioned Kantian aporia in such a way that the convincing objec-
tions of Schulze’s Aenesidemus are “completely satisfied”28. Fichte’s Aenesidemus
review followed this goal. It consisted in “uniting” dogmatic and critical thinking into
one systematic thought. In the Vorrede of the Begriffsschrift Fichte writes (1794c:29):
He, the author, believes “to have found the grounds . . . which are able to satisfy
completely those very legitimate objections of the skeptics to critical philosophy. He
believes to have found the grounds on which it is possible to unite the dogmatic and
critical system completely in their conflicting claims, as are unified through critical
philosophy the conflicting claims of the different dogmatic systems.” In note 1 to this
aim Fichte makes very clear the presence of Jacobi’s immediacy in feeling: “The real
conflict between both (dogmatic and critical systems) . . . should be that between the
connections of our knowledge with a thing in itself. And the conflict should be re-
solved by a future Wissenschaftslehre in such a way that our knowledge is shown to be
connected—not immediately through representations—but mediated by feeling.” It
should be resolved by showing “that the things are indeed represented as appearences
but that they are felt as things in themselves, (and) that without feeling representing is
not possible, but that things are recognizeable in themselves only subjectively, i.e.,
only insofar as they act on our feeling.” In this way Fichte concentrates himself on the
relationship of speculation and life.29
C. Fichte’s Jacobian Realism
Fichte’s source of this idea of unification are the writings of Jacobi, who was called
by Fichte “the brightest thinker of his age”(1797:483).30 This “brightest thinker”
suggested, but rejected, the “strongest idealism” (1787b:310). More immediately
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below on why he could not accept and therefore had to reject his own suggestion.
But already in 1787 and then afterward the “strongest idealism” was conceived by
Jacobi as a “unification of materialism and idealism into an inseparable essence”
(Jacobi 1799a:7). He conceived this unified idealism as a solution to the mentioned
Kantian aporia. Jacobi believed that we had to “let go” the Kantian thing in itself in
order to save ourselves from the house of cards of the Kantian Idealism. This house
is built on the shifting sand of pure “faith” (1787b:309). “So the transcendentalist
must have the courage to assert the strongest idealism which has ever been taught.
He should not fear even the critique of speculative egotism” (1787b:310). But Jacobi
in reality does not so much want to discard, but rather to reprogram Kant’s thing in
itself to give it a new function. It reappears in Fichte’s thought as the “Not-I.” Jacobi
believes that the Kantian thing in itself must, in order to get out of the Kantian
aporia, be produced by the transcendental subject. But this production must be un-
derstood as a transcendental representation and not as what Kant had in mind, as a
realistic thing in itself (Jacobi, 1787b:307–309). “For according to the Kantian phi-
losophy, the intended object, which is always only appearance, cannot exist outside
of us as something more than a representation” (1787b:301f). The transcendental
object must rather itself be produced31 by the transcendental subject. Fichte took
this suggestion seriously and worked it into his own thought, now reconceived as a
“productive idealism.”32 Jacobi, identifying himself as a “realist” (1787b:299), used
in his brief suggestion of a “productive idealism” Kantian concepts or pairs of con-
cepts which also flowed into Fichte’s development, such as “spontaneity” and
“receptivity” (Jacobi 1787a:285; 1787b:306; Kant 1781:B277),33 “mediation” (Jacobi
1785:263)34 and “freedom” (Jacobi 1799b:311ff). These concepts then made their
way into the writings of Novalis, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and those other
giants in the intellectual “supernova” (Henrich 1992:20f) who contributed to the
heated post-Kantian discussion at Jena of the time. Kant distanced himself in vari-
ous writings from this development which he trifled with the same concept of
“intellectual intuition” (Kant, 1781:B 335), but developed positively in §§76 and 77
of the Critique of Pure Judgment of 1790 in the sense of a productive capacity on
the part of our ability to know: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel made use of this “intel-
lectual intuition,” the bridging category between reality and ideality Kant himself
proposed in the Critique of Judgment to coordinate the mechanism of natural laws
governing an organism with its teleological purpose.35 Extravagant claims made by
the new development in the name of “intellectual intuition”36 (Hammacher,
1969:132), claims which disregard knowable empirical evidence, are unhelpful for
sound philosophizing, for intuition always reacts receptively to given sensual input,
but the intellect produces a “complete spontaneity of intuition” (Kant 1790:777;
1790a: 275; AA V 406) “completely independent” from the sensibility. Kant himself
has promoted since 1790 the importance of an “intellectus archetypus” (1790:780;
1790a:277, AA V 408). Jacobi, although rejecting mere speculation, stressed the
legitimacy of immediate revelation and urged the primacy of “feeling and intuition”
(1785:347; Vorbericht 1819 ed.).37 Fichte, who followed him, placed intellectual
intuition into the center of the emerging transcendental idealism. In the eyes of
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Kant this new Fichtean development transgresses against all the boundaries of rea-
son he hoped to establish in his critical work. In a shot before the bow of early
romantic thought emerging with Jacobi’s and Fichte’s “intellectual intuition,” be
believed we should avoid “the realm of super-rationality filled with thick night” for
doing this means “to dream enthusiastically instead of thinking” (1786:15, 14). But
this development of early romantic thought is rooted in Kant’s thought itself. As we
have seen, Kant’s aporetic philosophy aimed at limiting reason to what can be em-
pirically known, but convinced the philosophical world that only the transcendental
reflex provided access to that knowability. Ultimately the real and its conceptuality
would have to be idealistically conveived. On top of that, Kant argued in the Third
Critique that only a spontaneously produced “Urgrund,” the intellectus archetypus
can explain the teleological dimension of organisms, a dimension which in prin-
ciple did not fit harmoniously with finite understanding grasping of causal
determinants: In principle this new departure in Kant is not at odds with the pro-
posal of a “stong idealism” Jacobi had outlined, a path which he himself, however,
was unwilling to take.38
How strongly Fichte leaned on Jacobi becomes fully clear in the first essay he
wrote at Berlin in 1800 immediately after he left Jena. Although it belongs to the
popular genre, it has great systematic significance, recognized by Günter Zöller
(1998b:4,121ff). Zöller correctly captures Fichte’s thought as an interplay of intel-
ligence and will. The will, however, ultimately has its root in faith. The Vocation of
Man (1800a, 1800c) is paradigmatically organized into three parts, which follow an
ascending order from doubt to knowledge and finally to faith. The third book on
faith contains whole passages taken verbatim from various writings by Jacobi: Ulti-
mately all knowledge is rooted in an unfathomable faith. For example: Jacobi had
said in the Sendschreiben: “God is outside of me, a living being, existing for itself,
or I am God. There is no third alternative” (1799a:22). Fichte writes in the Vocation
of Man: “I demand something beyond a mere representation, which is, has been and
will be” (1800a:248; see 1800c:93). On p. 251 (1800a:251; 1800c:97) Fichte con-
jectures that the autonomous I “is in reality the impulse of a foreign power invisible
to me.” He believes here that the assumed autonomy of the I is “merely a delusion.”
And a little later (1800a:253; 1800c:98f), he clearly pushes knowledge aside as the
primary principle of his Wissenschaftslehre. “I have found the organ by which to
apprehend . . . all . . . reality. Knowledge is not this organ (which I seek):—no
knowledge can be its own foundation, its own proof; all knowledge presupposes
another higher knowledge on which it is founded, and to this ascent there is no end.
It is faith, that voluntary acquiescence in the view which is naturally presented to
us, because only through this view we can fulfil our vocation.” Humanity’s vocation
then is faith, not knowledge. A little later Fichte insists, just as does Jacobi over and
over, that all demonstration and knowing will lead to nothing, but that since we will
and do know, prove and dispute, any proving, disputing and demonstrating lies rooted
in the deeper soil of faith: “The source of my conviction lies higher than all disputa-
tion” (1800a:245; 1800c:100).39 This phrase, “higher than all disputation” or “higher
than all reason” derives verbatim from Jacobi, who built his philosophy on a faith
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“that passes all understanding” as the Philippians 4:7 passage, quoted here by Jacobi,
states in the Revised Standard Version translation of the Bible. In the original Ger-
man Jacobi states, that faith lies “higher than all reason,” “höher denn alle Vernunft”
in the Briefe über Spinoza (1785:117:14–15). To avoid the “nihilism” of Idealism,
Jacobi had in his Sendschreiben identified his philosophy as one of “Not-knowing.”
His “Non-Philosophy” must be rooted in faith, which assumes “a higher place than
scientific knowledge” (1799a:13), which is reached through the immediacy of “feel-
ing,” “intuition” (Ahndung) and “faith” (1799a:15). This truth of faith is something
we know “immediately” Fichte insists now with Jacobi, for “we are all born in faith”
says Fichte (1800a:255) using the exact same words Jacobi used in his Briefe über
Spinoza in 1785 against Mendelssohn (1785: 115:15ff). All of Jacobi’s accusations
of Fichte, coming to a head in the Sendschreiben, which contributed centrally to
Fichte’s difficulties with the Weimar authorities in 1799, ring hollow. Is Fichte’s
thought at this time really all that different from Jacobi’s? Is it really “a philosophy
of one piece” (1799a:13)? “Nothing could be plainer,” writes Hegel in 1802 (1802b:
397:30–37; 1802c:167)
than the fact that Jacobi has misunderstood this system, when he says in his
Letter to Fichte that he believes that the Fichtean way produced “a philosophy
which is all of one piece, a genuine system of Reason, and indeed that the
Fichtean way is the only way it can be done.”40 He opposes Fichte’s philoso-
phy on the grounds that “what I [Jacobi] understand by the true is something
that is prior to and outside of knowledge.”41 But on this point Fichte’s phi-
losophy is in full agreement with Jacobi’s. The absolute exists for it in faith
alone, not in cognition. (1802b:397: 30ff; 1802c:167)
And specifically on Jacobi’s critique of Fichte’s “scientific” nature of truth, Hegel
goes on correctly saying that
Fichte is very far from sinning, as Jacobi claims (in the preface to his Letter p.
viii)42 against “the majesty of the place” where the true resides outside the
range of knowledge, nor does he want to “include it within the sphere of sci-
ence.” On the contrary, absolute identity is, for him, quite outside of the sphere
of knowledge, and knowledge is only formal, just as Jacobi would have it, and
within the difference [of I and Non-I]. (1802b:397:37–398:5; 1802c:167f)
Both Fichte and Jacobi share here the same skeptical-realist perspective, which has
no knowledge of the absolute. Therefore, reality participates for both Fichte and
Jacobi in that “atheism of the ethical life” (Hegel, 1821:7), a reality not really par-
ticipating in God and truth.43 This charge of atheism, however, which Hegel does
not make here explicitly but only implicitly, a charge which has its root in the in-
commensurability of God and world, is quite different from the official critique of
Fichte’s work as equating the moral world order with God and of teaching “doctrines
that oppose the general worship of God,” the specific change formulated by Goethe44
(Vieweg 1999:191–194).
It is now quite clear that Fichte came in 1799/1800 to share Jacobi’s “Non-Philoso-
phy.” (Neuhouser, 1990:21ff) “LIFE is actually NON-PHILOSOPHIZING;
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PHILOSOPHIZING is actually NON-LIFE” Fichte had said, as I had quoted above,
at the height of the “atheism-controversy,” in his letter to Jacobi of April 22, 1799
(1799a:61). It is important to recognize this skeptical development of non-knowledge
as an important step toward the full potential of German Idealism. Fichte’s subjec-
tive Idealism stands in a consistent line moving from the Cartesian “skeptical”
idealism, which rejects the empirical foundation of knowledge, to Schelling’s ob-
jective and Hegel’s absolute idealism. (Janke, 1987:1) But it is clear that in Fichte’s
subjective form that Cartesian skepticism was retained as Jacobi’s Non-Philosophy.
For faith “is no knowledge, but rather a resolution of the will to admit the validity of
knowledge” (1800a:254; 1800c:100).
D. Fichte’s Realistic Idealism and the Infinite Regress
Nevertheless, despite Fichte’s appropriation of significant elements of Jacobian
thought, major differences and friction appear to remain.45 Jacobi accuses Fichte’s
philosophy in the Sendschreiben of having its reality “alone in knowledge” whereas
his own philosophy, his “unphilosophy” has its “essence in Not-Knowing” (1799a:6).
But if Fichte characterizes also his own philosophy as “Non-Philosophy,” as does
Jacobi, where exactly is the point of disagreement? Why does Jacobi attack Fichte’s
thought as a “nihilism” and why does he insist that any idealism, like Fichte’s, is
essentially identical with being a “nihilism”? (1799a:19). For Jacobi all science is
identically “nihilistic.” Late in his career, in the year of his death, in his Vorbericht
to volume IV of his collected works of 1819 Jacobi says that it “is the interest of
science that God is not.” (1819b:343:18–19). He had expressed this thought earlier
in his Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung of 1811 (1811:216). Scien-
tific truth found by reason and demonstration inevitably leads to “fatalism,” Jacobi
had already said in 1785 (1785:248:11), whereas his own true philosophy, just as
also Fichte’s, is essentially a science of “not-knowing” which is “higher than all
reason” (1785:117:15).
The place where Fichte and Jacobi differ, and at which Jacobi attacks Fichte, can
best be understood in terms of one of the “two sides” (Hegel, 1801a:7:9; 1801b:82)
in Fichte’s thought, the “authentic” speculative or the transcendental side on the one
hand and the realistic side on the other. The first is philosophy in the genuine sense
(Hegel, 1801a: 7:17; 1801b: 82) and derives from Kant’s idealism. As a genuine
idealism it is the absolute identity of the principle I=I, the absolute identity of sub-
ject and object (1801a:36:13; 1802b:121). It skeptically denies the reality of anything
outside of this identity of subject and object in the principal I=I: “Outside of it (is)
nothing” (1801a:36:17f: 1801b:121). Hegel agrees with the one side, the specula-
tive side in Fichte. So Hegel diagnoses Fichte’s speculative, transcendental thought
as being “simultaneously an idealism and a skepticism” (Hegel, 1802b:320:35;
1802c:62). But it is identical with not the modern skepticism of Schulze but rather
with the ancient form of skepticism, present in Plato’s Parmenides “which grasps
and destroys by means of concepts of understanding the whole area of . . . (finite,
realistic) knowledge” (1801c:207:17f) of which skepticism is so proud, that “heap
of facts of consciousness” (1801c:207:10), that “bag of capacities,” that “collection”
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of psychological capacities that can be gathered “as in a bag” (1807: 169).46 Fichte
had further developed this skeptical idealism, as we had seen, having been influ-
enced by Jacobi. Hegel emphatically endorses Fichte’s speculative idealism, but is
critical of the Jacobian (and also Aenesidean, i.e., Schulzean) realistic critique of
transcendentalism. For Fichte’s thought is also indebted to Jacobi’s realism:
Besides the genuine speculative idealism there is another side to Fichte’s thought,
which mixes up, in Hegel’s view, the Kantian transcendental tradition of reason
(Vernunft) and reflexive understanding (Verstand). Fichte’s realistic indebtedness to
Jacobi “has equated Reason with pure consciousness and raised Reason as interpreted
in a finite form to the status of principle” (Hegel, 1801a: 7:11f; 1801b: 82).47 The
realistic side of Fichte’s thought has retained the Jacobian reflexive consciousness, a
mere “finite form” in Hegel’s words, and has elevated it “to the status of principle”
(1801a:7:1ff; 1801b:82). This latter must, as we had seen, be characterized as being
deeply indebted to Jacobi’s realistic faith assumptions (Vieweg, 1999:194).
Hegel recognized clearly these “two sides” in Fichte (Hegel, 1801a:7:9). He af-
firmed Fichte’s transcendental idealism, which is identical to skepticism: All empirical
sources of knowledge required to constitute the self need to be negated (Hegel,
1801c:207:22) to reach Fichte’s transcendental ground of self-constitution (Hegel,
1801a:36:5–20; 1801b:121). But Hegel rejected Fichte’s realism. It is essential that
we retain this nuanced shift48 of perspective in the development of thought from
Fichte to Hegel with all that depends on this, like the emergence of Hegel’s absolute
idealism out of a critical dependence on Fichte’s subjective idealism with the impo-
tence of the ought. I need to clarify Hegel’s position in greater detail:
Fichte’s transcendentalism was identified by Jacobi as the principle of identity in
the formula I=I. But opposing this principle of identity stands in Fichte’s thought a
principle of non-identity, derived from Jacobi’s realism. But Hegel observes that
“both principles A=A and A=B . . . remain in their antinomy side by side,
unsynthesized” (1801a:33: 19–20; 1801b:116).49 And that means that the synthesis
remains only a striving, not a real synthesis at all. It is at best a postulate (Vieweg,
1999:194f).50 The pure ought reproduces the Non-I of the identity, but “this abso-
lute opposition of Idea and intuition, and their synthesis . . . is nothing but a
self-destructive demand, since it postulates a union which still must not happen”
(1801a:46:26–28; see Vieweg 1999:195). With this mere demand the unacceptable
infinite regress of the argument emerges,51 an issue thematized already by the an-
cient skeptics. Here Fichte retains his indebtedness to the practical philosophy of
Kant, a debt further developed, as we have seen, in discussion with Jacobi’s sugges-
tive “productive idealism.” Hegel is critical of the Jacobian productive idealism, for
the realistic non-identity and the idealistic identity do not really achieve an identity
or a unity. They are rather elevated into the mere production, understood as “an
absolute production” in which “the product has no stability” (1801a:32:32,
1801b:116). Hegel clarifies the unsatisfactory nature of the Fichtean situation: The
realistic, causal influence of what is known on the intellect, and the idealistic causal
determination of empirical intuition as a knowable thing are unsatisfactorily related
in Fichte’s thought. Their unification is at best a mere possibility and as such “only
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an accident” (1801a: 33:3; 1801b:116; see Theunissen, 1970:20). The unity is no
more than an ought. The antinomy between realistic and idealistic assumptions re-
mains unresolved (Vieweg, 1999:194f). “This absolute juxtaposition of the (idealistic)
idea and of the (realistic) intuition and the synthesis of both, which is nothing but a
self-destructive demand, since it postulates a union which still must not happen—
all this is expressed in the infinite progress” (1801a:46:26–29; 1801b:134). Hegel
diagnoses Fichte’s “synthesis” of idealistic and realistic principles as insufficient,
for the principle of identity of the infinite idea excludes non-identical multiplicity,
whereas realistic temporality manifests pluriform juxtaposition and separateness,
excluding all infinite identity (1801a:46:33ff; 1801b:134). A synthesis is not ac-
complished. It is only hoped for. A concrete presence of the I remains an illusion. A
true temporality of the ideal is not achieved. And non-identical multiplicity pre-
cludes all possible redemption in the infinite.
Hegel does not reject Fichte’s thought. He is diagnosing his thought as inconsis-
tent and imperfect. The truly transcendental side of Fichte does find the “identity of
idealism and skepticism” (1802b:320:35; 1802c:62). It is nothing but a genuine rec-
onciliation of infinite and finiteness. Hegel sees this present in the genuinely specu-
lative idealism of Fichte: “When time was fulfilled the infinite longing that yearns
beyond the body and the world reconciled itself with existence. But the reality with
which it became reconciled . . . did not itself lose the character of absolute opposi-
tion implicit in beautiful longing. Rather, it flung itself upon the other pole, of the
antithesis, the empirical world” (1802b: 318:4–10; 1802c:58f). So reconciliation is
carried out imperfectly. This is Hegel’s critique of Fichte: His version of transcen-
dental philosophy, as also Jacobi’s thought, is at best a dualism. Only the “one side”
of Fichte’s thought, the genuinely speculative side, can claim idealistic status, but
because it operates with the “realistic” assumption, its idealism is tainted, and com-
plete reconciliation, which achieves the ideal, has not been found. Fichte’s merely
“formal idealism which in this way sets an absolute Egoity and its intellect on one
side, and an absolute multiplicity, or sensation, on the other side, is a dualism. Its
idealistic side—which claims for the subject certain relations, called categories—is
nothing but an extension of Lockeianism” (1802b:333:24–28; 1802c:78, my em-
phasis). Hegel says this from the perspective of the emerging philosophy of Spirit,
which takes in the early Jena essays the form of the philosophy of identity, which
stands close to Schelling’s philosophy of identity at this time.52 In the early Jena
essays Hegel thinks that Kant’s, Fichte’s and Jacobi’s juxtaposition of “idealism”
and “realism” is meaningless. This kind of dualism, permeating the line of thought
from most recently Fichte, to Jacobi, and Kant to Locke, operates with a problem-
atic view of consciousness. It is problematic because this view of consciousness is
not “Mitte,” mediation (1803/04:277:18) or spirit or true consciousness at all
(Philosophie des Geistes 1803/04:265ff): To truly understand the process of know-
ing the juxtaposition of the real and the ideal or of the known object and the know-
ing subject, of active spontaneity and passive receptivity, requires a reconceptuali-
zation of the concept of consciousness: A concept of consciousness that understands
it as mediating spirit. “The concept of spirit determined in this way is consciousness
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understood as the concept of the unity of simplicity and infinity” (1803/04:266:2–
5). Hegel operates here with the category of “true” infinity (1803/04:266:4f). It is as
the mediating work the “true infinity” of “spirit” which is identical with conscious-
ness. However, the emergence of this concept of mediating “spirit” in 1803/04 is the
later emergence of the solution to the problem of the ultimately realistic dualism of
the tradition of thought from Fichte to Locke. With the concept of “spirit” which
emerges in the lectures of 1803/04 Hegel “believes to be able to solve the idealism/
realism dilemma as well as the epistemological problem in general” (Bienenstock,
1989:28). What emerges is the argument of the limit, the “Grenze.” Fichte’s and
Jacobi’s “infinite” is not true infinity at all (1812/13a:79–81).53 On the contrary:
Because Fichte’s consciousness has no determinateness at all, his “is a completely
ludicrous idealism, which interprets the subject, the active agent of the opponents,
as one member of the opponents and sees it as determined while at the same time
hoping to liberate it from the determinateness of an externality” (1803/04:293:16–
19).54 It cannot be both determined and not determined. If the infinite is conceived
as separating itself from the finite and determined for the sake of hoping to gain true
autonomy, it is no more than a part of the finite itself insofar as it is determined by
the finite (Hegel, 1830:87:27–32). In the Fichtean juxtaposition of the infinite and
the finite the former stands in a Wechselbeziehung55—in an “alternating determina-
tion” to the finite:
The finite is so only in relation to the ought or to the infinite, and the latter is
only infinite in relation to the finite. They are inseparable and simultaneously
completely other over against one another. Each has the other of itself in itself.
It is this alternating determination (Wechselbestimmung) . . . which emerges
as the progress to infinity, a progress which in so many forms and applications
is accepted as something ultimate beyond which thought does not go, but,
having got as far as this and so on to infinity, has usually reached its goal. The
reason why this transcending is itself not transcended has become apparent. It
is merely the bad infinite that we have at hand; it is indeed transcended, for a
new limit is posited, but the result is rather only a return to the finite. This bad
infinity is in itself the same thing as the perennial ought; it is indeed the nega-
tion of the finite, but it cannot in truth free itself therefrom. (1812/
13b:81:4–17)56
This infinite of the infinite progress, which remains affixed with finitude, has
its other, the finite in itself. For this reason it is thereby conditioned and is
itself finite. For this reason it is the bad infinite because it is not so in and for
itself but only insofar as it relates to its other. This infinite is itself finite. (1812/
13b: 81:22–27)57
To be sure, Hegel concedes that “indeed, the unity of the finite and infinite” is
found in Fichte. “But this unity is not reflected on. Yet it is this unity alone which
evokes the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite. It is the mainspring of
the infinite progress.” What remains is the
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vain unrest of advancing beyond the limit to infinity only to find in this infi-
nite a new limit in which, however, it is as little able to rest as in the infinite.
This infinite has the fixed determination of a beyond, which cannot be reached,




This paper is a significantly modified version of a paper with the title “Jacobi, Fichte und
Reinhold über Spekulation und Leben,” read on October 4, 2000, at the Fichte conference on
the theme “Fichte in Berlin,” sponsored by the Internationale Fichte Gesellschaft. That paper
has been published in Fichte und Seine Zeit, ed. Hartmut Traub (Beiträge zum vierten Kongress
der Internationalen Johann-Gottlieb-Fichte-Gesellschaft in Berlin vom 03–08. Oktober 2000).
Fichte Studien, vol. 21, Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2003, pp. 5–29. This adaptation dif-
fers in these points: For space reasons the role of Reinhold in the Jacobi-Fichte dialogue
around the turn of the century is almost completely deleted. Also, for the same reason, much
of the contextual discussion of that dialogue, which had been relegated to the notes, is de-
leted. This English-language version also differs in a more substantive way in its last part, in
which Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s Sollen is highlighted, an argument completely lacking in
the original paper.
1. Fichte to Jacobi April 22, (1799:61) In translating the original I leave intact Fichte’s
own way of accenting in capital letters, as also other forms of accentuation such as cursive
print. Throughout this paper, I consult available translations wherever possible. Occasionally
I will modify available translations for reasons of precision, style, or new standardization of
terminology, e.g. Hegel’s “spirit” has been substituted for the older “mind.”
2. See W. Schrader, (1993) See also K. Hammacher (1993a).
3. Fichte here adds this note after “point of unification”: “Which Reinhold, if I under-
stand his last letter correctly, appears to seek, being misled more recently by Jacobi’s opposition
to speculation.” Fichte’s reference to Reinhold’s “last letter” indicates Reinhold’s (first)
Sendschreiben, his letter to Fichte of March 27 and April 6, 1799 (1799). Fichte rejects any
possibility of finding a mediating position, a Vereinigungspunkt, between the common, ordi-
nary perspective, which views objects directly, without interjecting the transcendental reflex,
and the transcendental reflective process, which thematizes thought itself. Schrader observes
(1993:91) that this letter indicates a first step Reinhold takes distancing himself from Fichte.
Reinhold is “the first theoretician of unification of the post-Kantian philosophy” (Bondeli,
1995:20).
4. Fichte was knowledgeable of and centrally influenced by Reinhold’s writings, and
they corresponded with each other—during the second phase of Reinhold’s thought, he was
very close to Fichte. Reinhold’s main influence on Fichte consisted in the impetus to tran-
scend Kant’s duality of the sources of knowledge, intution and conceptual originality.
Furthermore, Reinhold and Jacobi were in close contact and talked with each other about
Fichte’s position. Reinhold writes to Fichte in a letter dated March 27 and April 6, 1799, his
first Sendschreiben, (Reinhold, 1799) which was published, that he had met Jacobi in Eutin
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and talked with him and that it became clear to him that he, Reinhold would “have to take
position between him and you.” (1799:47) Reinhold comes to speak about this, his intermedi-
ary position between Jacobi and Fichte also in his 2nd Sendschreiben of 1801 (1801:126–134
See esp. p. 128). Fichte finally, after repeated requests by Reinhold to look at Bardili, re-
sponds in his devastating Bardili Rezension of 1800 (1800b). Reinhold himself was implicated
by this harsh criticism. See on this Schrader, (1993).
5. For reasons of space limitations, this paper must de-emphasize Reinhold’s position in
the convoluted issues debated in the post-Kantian debate.
6. Italics added. I should mention here that Hammacher’s first book on Jacobi of (1969)
carries the title Kritik und Leben, Critique and Life, the two major conflicting themes in
Jacobi’s philosophy which became so pivotal for early Romantic and early Idealistic philoso-
phy. Hammacher stressed the existential-philosophical roots of the later so called school to
Jacobi and Fichte. On Fichte’s philosophical existentialism see the excellent essay by Hartmut
Traub, “Fichtes Lehre vom Sein. Ein existenzphilosophischer Deutungsversuch” (2003b) in
Rolf Ahlers, editor, System and Context/System und Kontext. Vol. VII, (2003a) forthcoming.
7. Jacobi is a major originator of vitalistic philosophy. Life is the true form of Vernunft,
reason, insofar as it is consciousness. “Life and consciousness are one and the same.” (David
Hume 1787a:263f). Life is characterized by action and reaction. Perception is essentially
reaction, and the truly perceptive person is constituted in its reasonableness through feeling,
Empfindung. So Vernunft, reason, constitutes the person and this constitution is nothing but
the reaction of feeling to the action of vital life: “Every perception is . . . a concept. As the
action, so the reaction. If the capacity to take in impressions developed so plentifully and
perfectly that an articulated echo arises in consciousness, the word elevates itself above feel-
ing. What appears is what we call reason. What appears is what we call person. / So the
reasonable being is different from the unreasonable being through a higher degree of con-
sciousness, that is, through life. This degree must emerge in the same relationship as the
capacity emerges to differentiate from other things extensively and intensively. – God differ-
entiates himself most completely. So God must have the highest personality. He must possess
a completely pure reason.” But Jacobi goes further. There are gradations of personality. “The
perfection of feelings determines the perfection of consciousness with all its modifications.
As is the case with receptivity, so also with spontaneity, as with sense, so with understanding.
The degree of our capacity to distinguish ourselves from things outside of us intensively and
extensively is the degree of our personality. It is the degree of our spiritual height. With this
most precious capacity of reason we have received divine intuition of him WHO IS: OF A
BEING which has its life in itself. Freedom drifts toward the soul from this source and the
realms of immortality open up .“ (1787a:285).
8. Fichte says in a fragment added to his letter to Jacobi of April 2, 1799: “Only nature
gives to us life, not art” (1799:60); “art” of course is artificial, reflective and speculative.
Philosophy and speculation is art and artificial, not natural. Wissenschaftslehre is not vital-
ism: although the Wissenschaftslehre “is not Lebensphilosophie, philosophy of life, because
it does not have the vitality and the immediacy of experience, it nonetheless provides a com-
plete image of it,” i.e., life. (Sonnenklarer Bericht, 1801a:408). God, being, the absolute, is
the “exclusive” and “true life” (1805:361).
9. Jacobi to Hamann letter of June 16, 1783, Briefwechsel, (1987) vol. I,3, quote p. 163.
10. This theodiceic idea is central to the thought of Odo Marquard: Modern philosophy
from Kant to the beginning of the 20th century is dominated by the “struggle against its own
superfluousness.” Marquard, (1989: 414, 416, 420). This formulation derives from Helmut
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Plessner’s Die Verspätete Nation, first published in 1935, Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften
1982 vol. 6, p. 169. See also Marquard, “Unburdenings: Theodicy Motives in Modern Phi-
losophy” (1991:8ff). On Hegel’s conception of philosophy as theodicy, see my essay (2000).
11. This principle, which probably Jacobi first pronounced in modernity, has had a long
history in our western intellectual tradition. It reappears, e.g., in the law professor Pierre
Schlag’s recent book The Enchantment of Reason. (1998). The thesis is that no system of
reason is infallible, and that to claim this implies having “an immoderate confidence, an
excessive faith in (your) reason” which “would translate into a kind of overextension of
reason.” Quote at 1.
12. My emphasis. Hegel took over and inverted the meaning of this Jacobian statement.
See e.g. Hegel, Enzyklopäde der Philosophischen Wissenschaften ed. Moldenhauer/Michel,
TWA vol. 9, p. 20. But shining through this inverted appropriation of Jacobi’s formulation is
Schlegel’s critique of Jacobi in his review of his novel Woldemar (1796:265) as an anti-
intellectual theologian who does not use his head: Whoever asks of philosophy to make a
beautiful human being like Shakespeare’s Juliette “will sooner or later arrive at Romeo’s
sublime statement in Shakespeare: ‘Hang up philosophy!’” Schlegel criticizes Jacobi’s “su-
perstition and Schwärmerei” as an anti-philosophical anti-intellectualism. We know that Hegel
was influenced by Schlegel’s Woldemar review. Hegel is talking in the quoted passage (TWA
9:20) about philosophy of nature, specifically about the science of physics. Philosophy con-
ceptually reformulates the material physics has provided to it. And such philosophical
understanding of physics is the true form of understanding such material. See Dieter Henrich,
(1989:124). Of course Marx appropriated Hegel’s dialectic but believed that he needed to
“demystify” Hegel: Religion and philosophy are a drug paralyzing hands and feet. So Hegel’s
dialectic needs to be turned upside down to walk on its realistic feet.
13. Physics is the pedestrian science, that is, it is essential. “Physics must work together
with . . . philosophy so that it can translate its understood generality into the concept by
proving how it proceeds as a necessary whole by means of the concept.” Hegel, Encyklopädie
of 1830. (TWA vol. 9:20) The heady, conceptual work of philosophy is required to fashion
pedestrian physics into a whole, i.e., coherent and methodologically convincing science. And
because philosophy is essential, it is not willful. “Philosophy’s way of representation is not a
willful fancy to want for a change to walk on your head after having walked by foot for a long
time.” For “since the ways of physics do not satisfy the concept we must proceed further”
through the work of philosophical conceptualization. (TWA 9:20).
14. See. Lauth, (1971:266). In the Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre Fichte
pointed to Jacobi in support against his opponents. He says (1797:508): The main source of
errors of “my opponents lies in the fact that they do not make clear what it means to demon-
strate. They do not observe that at the root of all demonstration is something completely
incapable of being demonstrated. Also on this point they could have learned from Jacobi.
Jacobi has clarified completely this point, as also many other issues of which my opponents
know nothing.”
15. When not rendering my own translation of the original text, but quoting George
diGiovanni’s translation (Jacobi, 1994), I quote that text in addition to the original German
text in the Jaeschke edition (1799a).
16. The term “philosophy of identity” is often reserved for Schelling. But it is no longer
a secret that Schelling was inspired by the Jacobi. I do not believe that Jacobi actually used
the term Identitätsphilosophie, or “philosophy of identity.” But he did talk about his “in-
verted Spinozism” (1799a:6) as an “absolute identity . . . (of) the object and the subject”
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(1799a:6) or of “the identity of this object-subject” (1799a:12). Schelling was indeed cen-
trally influenced by Jacobi’s discussion of Spinozistic “identity” in the development of his
own “philosophy of identity.” See Lauth (1974c:228 and note 15).
17. Jacobi makes reference twice (1799a:7) in his Sendschreiben to the New Testament
figure “Nathanael” once to “Nathanael Reinhold” and just a few lines down he says: “I am a
Nathanael only among the Gentiles.” See Hammacher (1998:14).
18. Moses Mendelssohn is accused in the Briefe of such a religion of the law. Moses
Mendelssohn expressed, however, in Jerusalem Or the Religious Power of Judaism of 1783,
the view that “faith is not commanded. For it accepts no other command than those that come
to him on the path of conviction. . . . Wherever eternal truths of reason are addressed we
speak of knowledge and recognition, but not of faith.” Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften
(1971 ff.) vol. 8: 166. It is clear that Jacobi uses here the traditional Christian misrepresenta-
tion of Judaism and the Torah as the “law.” Judaism is known in Christianity, and specifically
in Jacobi’s Lutheran persuasion, as the “religion of the law,” and Christianity knows itself as
the “religion of the gospel.” Kant shared this view of Judaism and it is present even in
Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, although he does correct in the quoted passage the questionable
perspective. Jacobi characterizes Fichte as the “Messiah of speculative reason” and Fichte’s
Wissenschaftslehre is as the speculative “unification of (realistic) materialism and Idealism”
(Jacobi, 1799a:7) a book of the Jewish law. It has become a “stumbling stone” to the “Jews of
speculative reason” insofar as the Sendschreiben is written at the height of the Atheism Con-
troversy in which the Christian orthodoxy of Fichte’s speculative thought—Kant belongs to
this group—is put into question. Jacobi, however, contributed as much as anyone to condemn
Fichte with his Sendschreiben, as Fichte fully knew. On the relationship of Jacobi’s, Kant’s
and Mendelssohn’s questionable view of Jewish “law,” see Hammacher (1998:14f).
19. The Wissenschaftslehre “is not something which exists independent of us or outside
of our actions. It is rather something which is to be brought forth through the freedom of our
spirit which operates in a certain direction.” The Wissenschaftslehre “ist, als solche, nicht
etwas, das unabhängig von uns, und ohne unser Zuthun existirte, sondern vielmehr etwas, das
erst durch die Freiheit unseres nach einer bestimmten Richtung hin wirkenden Geistes
hervorgebracht werden soll.” Fichte (1794c:46).
20. This view is true more of Jacobi than for Fichte.
21. In the Briefen Jacobi had argued that thinking God would demote him inevitably into
a finite being. This argument stands against Kant, who placed barriers before speculative
reason for fear of the production of empty dreams.
22. See to the following classic formulation Jaeschke (1986). Interpreting Jacobi’s for-
mulation, Jaeschke says: “Jacobi places the knowledge of non-philosophy in place of
philosophical knowledge of nothing. Truth is not in knowledge, but rather outside of any
science of knowledge if there is to be any truth at all. If it were humanly knowable, it would
cease to be truth” (1986:118).
23. See what Hegel replies to this statement by Jacobi: “Philosophy, on the contrary,
says, there is a third way, and it is philosophy only because there is one. For philosophy
predicates him as the absolute identity of being but also thought, that is, Ego, and recognizes
him as the absolute identity of being and thought. Philosophy recognizes that there is no
outside for God, and hence that God is not an entity that subsists apart, one that is determined
by something outside it, or in other words, not something apart from which other things have
standing. Outside of God nothing has standing at all, there is nothing. Hence the Either-Or,
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which is a principle of all formal logic and of the intellect that has renounced Reason, is
abolished without trace in the absolute middle” (1802b:399:3ff: 1802c:169).
24. Jacobi knows that “standing outside of the door of Fichte’s lecture hall” he had proph-
esied Fichte’s “unification of (realistic) materialism and idealism into one inseparable being”
(1799a:7). He had prognosticated this in his Ueber den transzendentalen Idealismus (1787b).
25. See Zöller (1995:119) See Breazeale (1981:555f).
26. Schleiermacher appropriated Jacobi’s doctrine of the identity of self- and world-con-
sciousness. He was indebted to Jacobi for the duration of his life on this point. We know that
for sure now that we have the original of a letter to Jacobi of March 30, 1818 (Schleiermacher
1818). Until recently, this letter had been available only in the form of copies but the original
has been found. See Arndt, (1996:1062f).
27. Breazeale does not dwell on Jacobi’s immediacy. But he does highlight Fichte’s “cir-
cularity of thought” (1981:555).
28. See Wayne Martin (1996).
29. Wolfgang Schrader says (1972:11): “Only in the course of the Atheism Controversy
does the concept of life, conceived in the early stages of (Fichte’s) thought, become question-
able. This is so because now no longer is the I posited as the principle of life but rather life is
now recognized as the origin and source of the reality of the I.”
30. See Frank (1997:81).
31. In the Sendschreiben Jacobi talks of the “productive imagination” of transcendental
idealism (1799a:12). It is as the “strongest idealism” (1787b:310) necessary because he inter-
prets the Kantian philosophy anti-idealistically. Here is the whole passage: “The Kantian
philosopher goes right against the spirit of his system whenever he says that the objects
produce impressions on the senses through which they arouse sensations, and that they bring
about representations. For according to the Kantian hypothesis, the empirical object, which
is always only appearance, cannot be outside us and be something more than a representation.
On the contrary, according to the same hypothesis we know not the least of the transcenden-
tal object.” (1787b:301f; 1787c:335). If then we cannot really know the thing in itself—Jacobi
rejects this “realist” doctrine of Kant as inconsistent with his transcendental hypothesis—
Kant’s transcendental idealism must be made consistent through the “productive imagination”
(1799a:12) of the “strongest idealism” (1787b:310). All true idealism, bent on scientific knowl-
edge, is “productive” in this way (1799a:25, 27).
32. See on this Jaeschke (1999:151–153): “Produktionsbegriff des Wissens und
Ausschließlichkeitsanspruch der Wissenschaft.“ I need to add that theology can very well be
interested in Fichte’s „productive Idealism“ and in the way Hegel later reworked it and still
affirm scientific status. So Jaeschke’s „Ausschließlichkeit“, i.e., exclusiveness, which he claims
for science and reason can be large enough to also accommodate theological interests.
33. In Jacobi’s David Hume (1787b:285) “spontaneity” stands opposite to “receptivity.”
Just this juxtaposition of “spontaneity” and “receptivity” can be found in Kant, (1781a:B274).
Schleiermacher developed this pair of concepts in his Glaubenslehre and in his Dialektik.
Because of lack of space I cannot pursue here the unique and varying ways different thinkers
after Kant developed this pair of concepts.
34. Jacobi speaks in the famous Beylage VII to the Briefe über Spinoza of “media-
tion”(1785:263, 1994:377). On p. 262, Jacobi speaks of a “beginning . . . of an inner resolution
or of a self-determination” and of that which is “immediately” clear to us in distinction to
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“what is the simple result of mediation.” See to this Jacobian root of the famous Hegelian
(and Schellingian) use of Vermittlung, “mediation” Dieter Henrich, Konstellationen
(1991:237f).
35. Kant uses the concept “intellectual intuition” in various places, e.g. (1781:B 335) in
the remark “on the amphibole of concepts of reflection.” At the end of the 3rd chapter of the
second book of the transcendental analytic. Generally, the term “intellectual intuition” is
used in a positive way at the fountainhead of early romantic and early idealistic thought, e.g.
by Fichte and later by Hegel. Fichte uses the term “intellectual intuition” positively e.g. in
his Aenesidemus review. Fichte says here: “The I is intellectual intuition . . . because it is, and
it is what it is; so it therefore posits itself completely self-sufficiently and independently”
(1794:22). Here Fichte also expresses the idea of the absolute synthesis of the immediate I
which, however, cannot grasp itself in thought, which, rather is present only in the “intellec-
tual intuition.” See to this Arndt (1994:64.) See also Lauth (1974c:251f.) This term “intellectual
intuition” also appears in Fichte’s Antwortschreiben to Reinhold (1801b:159). In Hegel the
“intellectual intuition” is e.g. the recognition of the Spinozistic infinity of substance. It is a
knowledge in which “the particular and finite are not excluded [from the infinite] as oppo-
sites, as [they are excluded] from the empty concept and from the infinity of abstraction”
(1802b:355:33–34; 1802c:107). See the comments of Frank and Zanetti in Kant (1790b:1294ff)
esp. on §§76 and 77 of the KU (1790b). Eckart Förster traces in his essay (2002) the signifi-
cant history of the two paragraphs 76 and 77 of the KU in the early romantic and early idealilstic
developments.
36. In the essay “Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren?,” published in the Berlinische
Monatsschrift in October (1786), but after Moses Mendelssohn had died that same year, Kant
favors Mendelssohn’s “pure reason.” He stresses this “mere reason” (my emphasis) against
Jacobi’s “extravagant claims of reason” and “secret sense for truth onto which could in the
name of faith be grafted tradition or revelation without the affirmation of reason.”
Mendelssohn’s path is to be favored, Kant believes. Humans can orient themselves in thought
by trusting reason exclusively.
37. See Dierse, U./Kuhlen, R. (1971) “Anschauung, intellektuelle,” Historisches
Wörterbuch der Philosophie I:349–451.
38. The relationship of Jacobi and Kant is complex. Jacobi’s understanding of Sein, spe-
cifically on his the relationship of Möglichkeit and Wirklichkeit in his Letters on Spinoza had
been influenced by Kant’s precritical essay on Der Einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer
Demonstration des Daseins Gottes of 1763. See Henrich, Grund (1992) 48ff, see esp. 50–55.
39. In the Berlin Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre of 1801 Fichte speaks of the grounds
of certain knowledge: “On what does . . . knowledge rest”? (1801c:5) And he goes on to
indicate that “pure being,” the “Absolute,” is that ground. It lies “above absolute knowledge
and is independent of it.” (1801c:13 my emphasis). Fichte here also speaks of the “feeling of
dependence” (1801c:62) of knowledge on this ground which lies beyond and above knowl-
edge, indeed, he uses Schleiermacher’s term Abhängigkeitsgefühl. This later development in
Fichte lies outside of the more immediate way in which Schelling (and the early Jena Hegel)
interacted with and criticized Fichte’s I=I as “abstract,” “empty” and as having no content.
Schelling’s critique of Fichte’s early, Jena thought promises to retrieve concrete reality, which
lies beyond the restrictions of reason through negative theology. But are not that Schellingian
(and Heidegger’s) being and the later Fichte’s Absolute related, being mediated by Jacobi’s
idea of an absolute “beyond all reason” which grounds all human reason and thought? Hösle
at least hints at this (1988:38 and note 45). I suspect, however, that Wofgang Janke is correct
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that “possibly the most powerful controversy on the principle and method of the first philoso-
phy in the 19th century has not (yet) happened” (1993a:41).
40. Hegel quotes here, without reference, Jacobi’s Sendschreiben (1799a:13).
41. Hegel quotes another passage from Jacobi’s Sendschreiben (1799a:15).
42. Hegel quotes another passage from Jacobi’s Sendschreiben (1799a:5), again without
annotation.
43. Fichte wrote to the Weimar government minister Voigt on March 22, 1799 (Röhr,
1987:366f.). In it Fichte said that a similar charge of atheism must be made over against the
Generalsuperintendent Herder’s God. Herder’s “published philosophical treatise on God is
as identical with atheism as one egg is with another,” Fichte said (Röhr, 367). But that cri-
tique, which is quite valid, has implications for Jacobi, for Herder wrote his God in response
to Jacobi’s Sendschreiben. Jacobi was quite miffed about Fichte’s accusations of Herder as an
“atheist,” although he did want to help Fichte. Fichte says that his own discretion prohibits
him from writing on Herder’s atheism. He says he would leave this question to “some one
else” who will “soon” do this. Schelling had been planned to be that someone else. But
Schelling refrained from writing on Herder’s atheism.
44. See Voigt an Goethe March 29, 1799, Röhr, (1987:372f) and particularly Goethe’s
formulation of the official charge in note 227, p. 583.
45. With Hegel I will argue that ultimately the points of difference between Fichte and
Jacobi are not very weighty. The perspective of an abiding and irrevocable conflict between
Jacobi and Fichte or an “ambivalence” (Hammacher, 1993:75) on the part of Jacobi over
against Fichte despite the observed mutual influence and similarity in thought-structure is
possible only if Hegel’s insight into their basic identity is ruled out of bounds. Klaus
Hammacher (1993) observes the mutual influence and proximity. He observes the abiding
difference between them that cannot be reconciled. This “both and” dichotomy is absent from
Hegel’s analysis. Would Hammacher take Hegel’s perspective, the “both-and” would also
disappear. But Hegel’s perspective is today only one of a variety of possible perspectives, for
Fichte-research has reestablished a position sui generis for Fichte by throwing light on Hegel’s
shadow, in which Fichte has stood for a long time. It is an important question, whether Hegel
“did justice” to Fichte (Siep, 1990:301). Another question that needs to be asked is whether
the ability to bridge the gap between the “abstract” I=I and the empirical totality—the “other”—
is possible or not. Hegel does criticize Fichte in Faith and Knowledge with the Schellingian
argument that the bridging is possible only in “faith.” Is this really an “unjust accusation”
(De Vos, 1997: 258f) and does Hegel portray a “distorted image of Fichte” (De Vos, 1997:259)?
This is after all a major reason why we identify Fichte’s transcendental idealism as a subjec-
tive idealism.
46. See Hegel (1802b:329:36), see Düsing (1994:246f), Vieweg, (1999b:194), Baur,
(1999). A note on Baur’s essay. The way in which for Hegel idealism is identified with skep-
ticism in the three mentioned early Jena essays does not become clear in Baur’s essay. He
does observe “similarities” and “differences” between Fichte’s and Hegel’s views on skepti-
cism (1999:85). But why idealism should be identical with skepticism does not become clear.
True: since the discussion around skepticism of the time is at least in the early romantic
discussion rooted in Fichte’s thought, the difference, identity or similarity between Fichte
and Hegel on this point is of relevance. But symptomatic of Baur’s analysis of that relation-
ship is that he pays no attention to the most authoritative authors on Hegel’s interpretation of
Fichte. Most of them are critics of Hegel’s critique of Fichte, such as Helmut Girndt (1965)
Ludwig Siep (1970, 1990, 2000), Wolfgang Janke (1983, 1993a and 1993b) de Voss (1997)
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and Christoph Asmuth (1999). A single sentence from the most authoritative Fichte scholar
should suffice to illustrate the problem. Janke says that “Hegel has not known the true work
of Fichte” (1983:168:49).
47. My emphasis. I have here modified Cerf/Harris to highlight the nuanced point Hegel
makes here.
48. This nuanced shift of constellations of philosophic issues in the development of ide-
alism is not retained in Michael Baur’s discussion of “The Role of Skepticism in the Emergence
of German Idealism” (1999). See above in note 46. That this shift is not retained in Baur’s
interpretation of Fichte is quite clear when we realize that Hegel categorizes Kant, Jacobi and
Fichte as realists who “take refuge” to “common reality” (1802b:318:18) and in whose thought
the “empirical” realm takes “absolute” priority, which is a “profound crudity” (1802b:318:19).
To this crudity relates the fact that all three are identified by Hegel as eudaimonists! This
comes out in the fairly long untitled preamble of Faith and Knowledge (1802b:315–324)
prior to the first of these ultimately realistic, eudaimonistic philosophers of understanding,
Kant (1802b:325ff). The title of Faith and Knowledge of 1802 must be taken seriously: “Re-
flective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the Complete Range of its Forms as Kantian, Jacobian,
and Fichtean Philosophy.” My emphasis. With “reflective philosophy” (Reflexionsphilosophie)
Hegel identifies throughout Verstand, understanding. So according to the title Kant, Jacobi
and Fichte are all philosophers of Verstand, understanding, not Vernunft, reason! To interpret
Hegel’s later thought correctly it is not a coincidence that he already here, in Faith and
Knowledge of 1802 makes a distinction between two forms of eudaimonistic happiness: the
psychological and empirical kind opposed by Kant, Fichte and Hegel, and the Aristotelian
“highest bliss” which is the “highest idea” (1802b:318:33; 1802c:59). Hegel makes a very veiled
reference (1802b:318f) to the famous passage in Aristotle, Metaphysics XII,7, on the “highest
bliss” of philosophy’s self-recognition, which he later quotes in the original Greek at the end of
the Encyclopedia of 1830. Aristotle was present to Hegel’s mind throughout certainly his Jena,
but we know also his Frankfurt and Bern years, right back into the Tübingen and Stuttgart
years. That is important for the emergence of the philosophy of spirit in 1803/04, where not
Herder, as Harris assumes, but rather Aristotle played a key role. See Bienenstock (1989).
49. Hegel’s critique of Fichte was influenced by Friedrich Schlegel’s critique of Fichte
beginning in the fall of 1796. Schlegel had observed that the principle of identity, of I=I, is
insufficient and cannot support by itself the claim of systematicity. See Manfred Frank
(1996:33f). Schlegel’s “Wechselgrundsatz” “alternating ground,” which appeared earlier as
“Wechselerweis,” “alternating proof,” but also “Wechselbegriff,” reappears in Hegel’s Logic
of 1812/13 as alternating determination. And it is no coincidence that Schlegel’s observation
that to make Fichte’s first, to his mind insufficient theoretical principle I=I work, Fichte
requires a second, a practical principle of the ought, reappears in Hegel’s critique of the
infinite progress and the “bad infinite” (1812/13: 79ff). It should be added that Schlegel’s
critique of Fichte’s philosophy is related to his view that it (and Jacobi’s thought!) is a “mys-
ticism.” That the Absolute is “indemonstrable” and cannot be verified—a position which
both Jacobi and Fichte share—destroys Fichte’s claim to scientific clarity. Jacobi’s position
displays a “mystical,” “theological talent” (Schlegel, 1796: 267), which will ultimately “hang
up philosophy” (1796:265), Schlegel says in his review of Jacobi’s Woldemar. In this review
his Wechselerweis, “alternating proof,” appears as an earlier version of the same idea and
partial composite word (1796:266). Jacobi applied this skeptical principle of the “alternating
proof” also to Fichte: He cannot redeem the scientific claim. On Schlegel’s critique of Jacobi
and Fichte as mysticism see Frank, (1996:31f). Asmuth rejects as unfounded Schlegel’s cri-
tique of Fichte’s thought as a mysticism (1999:68 and note 3).
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50. Kant’s doctrine of postulates had been central to the development of not only Fichte’s
thought, but also Schelling’s and Hegel’s early development, which was then influenced by
Fichte’s Jena thought. See Klaus Düsing (1999). In Glauben und Wissen Hegel sees also
Jacobi as belonging to this group of “striving” philosophers, because also he sees the abso-
lute as residing in an unreachable beyond, unrecognizable by reason.
51. The circularity of reason and the infinite regress, affirmed by Fichte as unavoidable
although as legitimate, is a central issue in Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s theory of the subject.
Its critique was voiced first by Schlegel, just as a similar issue of circularity was observed by
Carl Christian Erhard Schmid and by Carl Immanuel Diez in Reinhold. See Frank (1996:34).
See on Hegel’s critique of the infinite regress Klaus Düsing (1976, 1984:13): The problem of
subjectivity is the problem of the infinite reiteration. “In the language of German idealism we
could formulate the infinite reiteration thus: The I is indeed able to objectify itself as an
object by means of its reflection. But in doing so, it must presuppose itself as subjective
spontaneity. So the objectification is never possible.” This infinite reiteration is a problem
because the subject is never determinable because of the infinite regress. Therefore it does
not really exist. This is a logical problem and as such it is different from the insufficient form
in which it appears in Locke’s thought. Here the subject is simply seen as an empirical organ
of perception, which categorizes and sorts the perceived objects. Düsing says (1976, 1984:13)
of the infinite regress:
This infinite reiteration emerges in the empirical act of reflection in the determination
of an empirical self-representation. But it could be harmless as an alternative to the
theory of empirical subjectivity if we consider first that an adequate self-determina-
tion of a real, empirical self-consciousness is capable of presupposing only a possible,
not a real, fully developed self. And secondly, reflection as an act of thought must be
able to avoid the infinite reiteration separate from any empirical material in the con-
text of pure thought and self-consciousness. In this way the problem of the infinite
regress might not necessarily affect the concept of empirical self-consciousness.
52. See Bienenstock (1989:27f).
53. This chapter in the Seinslogik of 1812/1813 carries the title “Alternating Determina-
tion of the Finite and the Infinite.” Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s (and Jacobi’s) infinite pointed
out that it was no more than the “bad” or “finite infinite” (1812/13b:81:13, 80:10 Miller has
1812/13a:150 “spurious infinity”), i.e., it was no true infinite at all, but rather a finite infi-
nite, since it simply borders on finitude and is thus not an infinite at all. Hegel came to
resolve this issue with the help of Schlegel’s category of the “alternating proof” or “alternat-
ing determination,” which already in 1796 emerged as the “alternating Grundsatz,” “alternating
grounding principle.” See Manfred Frank (1996:33ff).
54. Hegel often does not identify the target of his observations. However, since he dis-
cusses (1812/13b: 291:21–293:19) the opposition between realism and idealism, we can assume
that he has in mind in this long passage mainly the way Fichte discussed the problematic in
the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794. We know that Hegel had read this
work carefully and we can surmise “with certainty” (1812/13b:383) that Hegel is discussing
here the realism/idealism problematic as Fichte discussed it in his Grundlage. I agree there-
with with Bienenstock (1989:29).
55. As indicated, Hegel’s alternating relation (“Wechselbeziehung”) or alternating deter-
mination (“Wechselbestimmung”) in the Logic of Being is an important category. In fact, Hegel
considers it to be the philosophical issue, as does Jacobi (1785:18). Ultimately alternating
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determination (Wechselbestimmung) is a principle of indifference. It is a principle of abso-
lute skepticism. It is a category which Hegel here, in the Seinslogik brilliantly analyzes as the
problem of all philosophy, as it first emerged in Jacobi’s Briefe über Spinoza, (1785:12–20).
56. See Vieweg (1999:22 and note). In my translation I depended on A.V. Miller’s rendi-
tion of Hegel’s Science of Logic (1812/13a:141f). Since, however Miller’s translation is based
on Lasson’s edition of 1923, I have used the critical edition prepared by Hogemann/Jaeschke
of 1978. So my rendition varies from Miller’s.
57. The great Idealism and Fichte scholar Wolfgang Janke clarifies well Hegel’s critique
of Fichte in his essay “Das bloß Gesollte” (1993b). See esp. 178f. What I call here with
Hegel’s term “bad infinite” is identified 179 by Janke as “in the end empirical.” “Fichte
makes” from Hegel’s perspective, “the worthless attempt to achieve a first philosophy with
the category of the ought,” writes Janke.
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